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This paper discusses the consequences of introducing imperfectly competitive product
markets into an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. We pay particular attention to
the consequences of imperfect competition for the explanation of fluctuations in aggregate
economic activity. Market structures considered include monopolistic competition, the "customer
market' model of Phelps and Winter, and the implicit collusion model of Rotemberg and Saloner.
Empirical evidence relevant to the numerical calibration of imperfectly competitive models is
reviewed. The paper then analyzes the effects of imperfect competition upon the economy's
response to several kinds of real shocks, including technology shocks, shocks to the level of
government purchases, and shocks that change individual producers' degree of market power.
It also discusses the role of imperfect competition in allowing for fluctuations due solely to self-
fulfilling expectations.
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and NBER and NBERIn this paper we discuss the consequences of introducing imperfectly competitive product markets in
otherwise standard neoclassical growth models. We are particularly interested in the effects of imperfect
competition on the way the economy responds at business cycle frequencies to various shocks. The literature
on equilibrium modeling of aggregate fluctuations has mainly assumed perfectly competitive firms. While
that represents an obvious starting point for analysis, we argue that there are important reasons for allowing
competition to be imperfect.
One reason is that imperfect competition makes equilibrium possible in the presence of increasing returns
technologies.This increased flexibility in the specification of technology may be of great importance in
modeling fluctuations, in particular for understanding cyclical variations in productivity. Empirical evidence
on increasing returns is discussed in section 3 below. We argue below that not only is imperfect competition
necessary if one wishes to assume increasing returns, but that conversely if market power is important one
is virtually required to postulate increasing returns, in order to account for the absence of significant pure
profits in economies like that of the U.S. Increasing returns may also make possible new sources of aggregate
fluctuations —inparticular, fluctuations due solely to self-fulfilling expectations.
Allowing for market power (and hence prices higher than marginal ct) and increasing returns may
have important consequences for the interpretation of business cycles, although we do not argue for a
particular theory of the cycle in this paper. In the real business cycle literature technology shocks have
usually been assigned a dominant role as the source of fluctuations. But the existence of market power
and increasing returns implies that the Solow residual, interpreted in the RBC literature as a measure of
exogenous technology shocks, contains an endogenous component. As Hall (1988, 1990) has emphasized this
endogenous component may be unrelated to true changes in technology. For example, we show below in a
complete dynamic model that increases in government purchases in the presence of imperfect competition
result in a positive Solow residual, as well as an increase in output and hours. Thus, if one assumes that
firms are perfectly competitive when they are not, one can be led to attribute to random technical progress
a fraction of the increase in output which is in fact generated by increased government purchases, or other
types of shocks that raise equilibrium output other than through an effect upon production possibilities.
'Increatog returns are compatible with competitive firms if the acreadog returns are external, ratb.er than internal to the
tm,, as in the model of Baxter and King (1990). We believe, however, that there is much more reason to believe that internal
increasing returns are important.
2Various empirical puzzles regarding the behavior of Solow residuals suggest that this endogeneity may be
important, as we discuss in Section 4.
Imperfect competition also changes the predicted effects of technology shocks when they occur. As shown
by Hornstein (1993), the ability of increases in productivity to stimulate increased employment is greatly
reducedinthe case of even rather moderate degrees of market power and increasing returns. We discuss this
further in section 5 below. Hence if imperfect competition is important, it seems likely that other types of
shocks will have to be assigned a major role in the explanation of business cycle variations in employment,
The hypothesis of imperfect competition does not in itself point one towards any particular alternative
source of shocks. However, it does introduce new potential sources of employment fluctuations as well as
providing a channel through which the importance of other shocks is increased. Imperfect competition
implies not only that price generally differs from marginal cost, but is also consistent with variations over
time in the gap between price and marginal cost. We show that an increase in this gap results in a reduction
in the level of labor input that firms demand at a given real wage. The effect upon labor demand is thus
similar to an adverse technology shock, while there need not be so large an offsetting wealth effect upon labor
supply. Thus changes in the markup of price over marginal cost are potentially an important determinant
of employment. We show that fluctuations in these markups, of a size that is not implausibly large given
data on the U.S. economy, can generate employment variations of the size observed. 2
Oneview of the source of markup fluctuations is that they result from exogenous changes in market
structure -forexample, in the context of the model of monopolistic competition developed in Sections 1-2
below, variations in the degree of substitutability between the differentiated goods. Under this view, imper-
fect competition introduces anew source of shocks. But it is also possible for markups to vary endogenously
in response to aggregate shocks with no direct relation to market structure. In that case, the effects of
markup variation become an additional channel through which such shocks can affect aggregate activity. As
we will show, this channel may be particularly important in understanding cyclical variations in employment.
We discuss several theories of endogenous variation in markups in Section 7, giving particular attention to
theories in which it is possible for the markup to fall when there is an increase in aggregate demand. We
2 InddiLion to the channels discu.aed below, it is worth pointing out that the a.umption that producer, have markei power
or ihe,r prodoci market, is an essential element in model, ol nominal price rigidity. Such price rigidity enhances the role 01
monetary policy shock, so a source of aggrr5sce fluctuations. For esamples of completely specmlled dynamic model, see Hoiramilt
and Portier(i992) andYun (1993).
3then illustrate the potential importance of allowing for endogenous markup variation by showing how these
theories affect the response of equilibrium employment to changes in government purchases.
Finally, the assumption of imperfect competition can lead to equilibrium aggregate fluctuations in the
absence of any shocks at all. In standard real business cycle models, there exists a unique equilibrium
(which corresponds to the solution to a planning problem). This equilibrium is necessarily independent
of 'sunspot" variables. But the introduction of imperfect competition implies that rational expectations
equilibria no longer correspond to the solution of a planning problem, and indeed there can exist several
distinct equilibria. Among these equilibria there may exist "sunspot" equilibria in which fluctuations result
from self-fulfilling shifts in expectations. The quantitative plausibility of this possibility has been analyzed
by Benhabib and Farmer (1992), GaIl (1992) and Farmer and Guo (1993).
A further aim of this paper is to show how existing empirical studies using data at various levels of
aggregation can be used to obtain estimates of the departures from perfect competition and from constant
returns. While our survey of this literature is far from complete, we show how existing evidence bearsupon
the calibration of certain of the key parameters of imperfectly competitive models,
Finally, the paper shows that incorporating imperfect competition into equilibrium business cycle theory
is easy. It is true that, because the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal, it is not possible to compute
the equilibrium by considering the solution to a planning problem. However, familiar methods for the
computation of dynamic general equilibrium models, that make use of an Euler equation characterization of
equilibrium (as discussed in detail in the next chapter) can also be applied when markets are not perfectly
competitive.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, we first develop a basic imperfectly competitive model, in
which firms are monopolistic competitors and there is no intertemporal aspect to their pricing problem. We
show that, under quite general conditions, firms will choose to charge a price which represents a constant
markup over marginal cost. We also discuss the connections between imperfect competition and increasing
returns. In section 2 we embed this model of firm behavior in a complete dynamic general equilibrium model,
and discuss the way in which the resulting model generalizes a standard real business cycle model. Section
3 provides a brief overview on the microeconomic evidence on the importance of imperfect competition. We
then discuss the numerical solution of the response to shocks. In section 4, numerical results are presented for
4shocks to the level of government purchases while section 5 concentrates on technology shocks. These sections
illustrate the importance of taking account of imperfect competition. They also show how a comparison of
the U.S. data and the model's responses can be used to obtain estimates of the quantitative importance of
the departures from imperfect competition. Section 6 shows that for some parameter values (involving a
sufficiently large degree of imperfect competition and increasing returns), the equilibrium response to shocks
becomes indeterminate. This opens up a new potential source of aggregate fluctuations, namely, fluctuations
due solely to self-fulfilling expectations, that may occur even in the absence of any stochastic disturbances
to economic "fundamentals".
Sections 7 and 8 then discuss models with markup variations. In section 7, we consider the consequences
of exogenous variations in the degree of market power (here modeled as due to exogenous changes in the
substitutability of differentiated products) in a model of the kind treated in sections 4 and 5. We show that
shocks of this kind can produce an overall pattern of co-movement of aggregate variables that captures several
features of observed aggregate fluctuations, and that they are in particular able to produce large movements
in employment. We estimate the size of markup fluctuations that would be required to account for observed
business cycle variations in employment in the U.S., and compare this with independent calculations of
the degree of cyclical variation in markups in the U.S. economy. In section 8, we discuss models in which
endogenous variations in markups occur in response to other kinds of shocks. We develop two models in
detail, the "customer markets' model of Phelps and Winter (1970), and the model of oligopolistic collusion
used in our own previous work. In this section we also illustrate the predictions of these two models regarding
the effects of changes in the level of government purchases. Here we particularly emphasize the ability of
shocks other than technology shocks to produce variations in labor demand. We also briefly discuss the
model of Gail (1992), in which the equilibrium markup depends on the composition of aggregate demand.
In the context of this model we discuss the possibility of aggregate fluctuations in the absence of any shock
at all.
1 The Behavior of Monopolistically Competitive Firms
We suppose that there exists a continuum of potentially producible differentiated goods indexed by the
positive real line. At any point in time, only the subset whose index runs from zero to i is actually produced.
5These goods are bought by consumers, the government and firms. The latter buy the differentiated goods
both as materials that are used in current production and in the form of investment goods that increase
the capital stock available for future production. To simplify the model, and to make it comparable to the
standard perfectly competitive model, we assume that all of these ultimate demanders are interested in a
single "composite good". In other words, the utility of consumers, the productivity of materials inputs, and
the addition to the capital of firma depends only upon the number of units of the composite good that are
purchased. An agent whose purchases of individual differentiated goods are described by a vector B, obtains
Q, Units of the composite good, where Q, is given by
Q,=f,(B,) (1.1)
We assume that the aggregator f, is an increasing, concave, symmetric and homogeneous degree one
function of the measure B,. By a symmetric function we mean that its value is unchanged if one exchanges the
quantities purchased of any of the individual goods, so that the value Q, depends only upon the disir,&uiion of
quantities purchased of individual goods, and not upon the identities of the goods purchased. The aggregator
Is the same for all of the purposes mentioned above; we allow, however, for variation over time, as the set of
differentiated goods being produced changes. The producer of each of the differentiated goods sets a price for
it; the collection of these prices describes a price vector P, conformable with the vector of goods purchases.
Consider an agent (be it a consumer, government or firm) wishing to buy (J units of the composite good.
The agent will distribute its purchases over the various differentiated goods 80 as to minimize the total cost
< P,, B, > of obtaining C,. Because f, is homogeneous of degree one, this cost-minimizing demand is equal
to G, times a homogeneous degree zero vector-valued function of the price vector:
B,=
Hencefor a given vector of prices P, all agents will choose scalar multiples of the same vector (P,). This
allows us to aggregate the demands of all types to obtain
B,=
whereQ, denotes total demand for the composite good for all purposes.
Furthermore, because f, is symmetric, the component i(P,) indicating purchases of goods I must
depend only upon the price p charged for that good and the overall distribution of prices charged. We will
6be concerned here only with symmetric equilibria. We will thus consider situations where all firms (with the
possible exception of firm i) charge a price of p, at while firm i charges p. In this case(P,) can be written
in the form D,(p/p,)/I,, where D, is a decreasing function, the same for all i, and I, denotes the number
of goods produced at date L D, depends only on the ratio of the two prices because z is homogeneous of
degree zero. (The normalization by I is simply for convenience.) The demand for firm i's product is then
given by
= LD,(&) (1.2)
By monopolistic competition we mean that each firm i takes as given aggregate demand Q and the price
p1 charged by other firms, and chooses its own price, p, taking into account the effect of p on its sales
indicated by (1.2). We are therefore interested in the properties of the demand curve D,.
Let us assume as a normalization of f, in each period that f,(M) = I, for all t, where M is a vector
of ones (or, in the continuum case, the uniform measure). Then since fg is symmetric, one must have
D,(1) = 1 for all I. We furthermore assume that D, is differentiable at 1, and that the value D(1) < —1 is
similarly independent oft The latter assumption means that the degree of substitutability between different
differentiated goods, evaluated in the case of equal purchases of all goods, remains the same as additional
differentiated goods are added, and the common elasticity of substitution is greater than one. Finally, we
assume that for each 2, D(p) + pD'(p) is a monotonically decreasing function of the relative price p over
the entire range of relative prices for which it is positive. This implies the existence of a downward sloping
marginal revenue curve for each producer of a differentiated good. The result of these assumptions is that,
at a symmetric equilibrium, firms face a time.invariant elasticity of demand. It is worth stressing that we
have obtained this result without having to make global assumptions on preferences, as is done for instance
iii Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
°Tlus eqmlibr,mn concept is as obvioun one, green thus we eventu.lly wish to anniune the existence of a continuum of goodo
in ends period, identifiedwith an interval 10.1,1onthe real line.In thicoatinmun limit, the price charged for an individual
goodobviously ban no effect upon roy agnit'. intertemporal allocation of total eapersditure, and .o hannoeffect upon the
equolibriumprocesoer {pi,Q,). Even in the cane of afinitenuniber of good., we can define equilibrium inthinway,justno
onecandefine Wolraoian equilibrium for on economy with a finite number of trade,,. However,theequilibrium concept only
becomes compellmgnoaformalrepresentation oftheoutcome ofcompetitioain the limit ofan infloite number of traders. For
rtgorous development of this equilibrium concept for the finite cane, see Becanny (1991,sec. 6.4)and referencescitedtherein.
Ii hasbecome common in ihe literatureinmacroeconomicsand international tradetoa.oume acontinuumof differentiated
foodo,especially when, no here, one winker to treat the number of good. an an nodogenoun variable.
• their model .f,(B,)inequalto [1(b;)i_o1T where0<0 <1. Theythurannumea globally constant
elasticityofsubstitutionequalto i/o'. Thin meann that D,(p) Ia equal p, no that D(1) = —i/ofor allI. Wealsoobserve thatthecondition of decrenoingmarginal revenueinsatisfiedfor allp. However, a globallyconntant elasticityof substitution
7We now turn to a discussion of the technology with which firms produce output. When considering an
economy with imperfectly competitive firms, it no longer makes sense to assume the kind of technology
specification that is standard in the real business cycle literature. Fiest of all, it is common in that literature
to assume a production function using only capital and labor inputs, ignoring produced materials. In the
case of perfectly competitive firms, this involves no loss of generality, as the output measure that one is
concerned with is total value added (the total product net of the value of materials inputs), and this can
indeed be expressed as a function of capital and labor inputs. Suppose that the production function for good
iisgiven by
q=G(K:,ziH:,M:) (1.3)
where :, is an index of labor augmenting technical progress at , while q denotes the output, Kthelevel of
capital services, Hthehours employed, and M the materials inputs of firm iinperiod t. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the price of materials is the same as the price for output, so that value added is given by q — M.
Inan equilibrium with perfect competition, this will necessarily equal
F(K:,ziH:)=rnax[G(K,ziH,M)—M'1 (1.4)
This follows from profit maximization by price-taking firms. Thus there exists a pseudo-production function
for value added with only capital and labor inputs as its arguments. Furthermore, by the envelope theorem,
the derivatives of Fwithrespect to its two arguments equal the marginal products of those two factors, that
must be equated to their prices (deflated by the price of output) in equilibrium. Thus one obtains correct
equilibrium conditions if one simply treats F as the true production function. This is implicitly what is
being done in the real business cycle literature (as in other common growth models).
But with imperfect competition, (1.4) is no longer correct. A monopolistically competitive firm will
choose its materials inputs so as to maximize
(1.5)
given the relation (1.2) between its sales and its price. Because p is not independent of the quantity sold,
materials inputs are not chosen as in (1.4), even though in a symmetric equilibrium p = pi• If (1.3) is a
of this kindinnowhereeusentiaito ow conclusion., whic,depend only on, thea..uxnption that the el.ustinty ofdemand in the
ofaniformprice. i. independent of noalo.
8smooth neoclassical production function, the first-order condition for choice of materials inputs implies that
in a symmetric equilibrium,
GM(K,z,H, Me') = [1+
sothat the use of materials inputs depends upon the degree of market power. Of course, we can still
solvethis equation for M as a function of (K,ztHfl, and so obtain an expression for value added as a
function of those two inputs alone. But apart from the fact that this function would not represent the
economy's true production possibilities, it would also change in the case of changes in the degree of market
power. In general, in the presence of imperfect competition the economy will be strictly inside its production
possibilities frontier (and not simply at an inefficient point on it given preferences over consumption and
leisure), and the degree to which it is inside will depend upon the degree of market power.
This complication can be avoided if one assumes a fixed-coefficient technology as far as materials inputs
are concerned. Suppose that (1.3) takes the form
q: =mm[V(K z1H) i-SM 5M
Here0 <sac<1corresponds to the share of materials costs in the value of gross output (in a symmetric
equilibrium). In this case firm i will always choose materials inputs M' sMqregardlessof the degree
of market power, and there exists a production function for value added that is independent of the degree
of market power, namely V(K,z&Hfl. We will in fact assume a production function of this form in what
follows, insofar as it seems realistic to assume that opportunities to substitute capital or labor inputs for
materials are relatively small; but in so doing we neglect effects that may actually be of importance.
With imperfect competition, materials inputs matter also for another reason and they continue to matter
for this reason even in the case of a fixed-coefficients production function. With imperfect competition,
materials inputs affect the size of the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage. For a
given degree of market power (i.e., a given slope D'(i)), and hence a given markup of price over marginal
cost, this wedge is greater the larger the share of materials. Hence taking account of materials inputs is
important when we wish to calibrate our model on the basis of evidence about typical degrees of market
power.
Forfurther deve1opmoi of thispoint, ,eBu (i992).
9To see this, note that in the case of the fixed-coefficients production function, capital and labor inpucs
are chosen to maximize
—wH'—rgK—sMql
wherew1 represents the wage deflated by the price of the composite good and r1 the rental price of capital
deflated in the same way, again given (1.2). (Because the present paper is concerned solely with imperfectly
competitive product markets, we assume that firms are price-takers in factor markets.) In a symmetric
equilibrium, the first order conditions for factor demands take the forms
Li + D'(l)' —SM)V1(K11,zH1) =[1—8M]r* (1.6a)
[1 + D'(i) —sM)z(V2(K',zgHfl =[1—SM]W (i.6b)
We assume that
SM <
sothat a symmetric equilibrium of this kind is possible. (We also defer discussion of second order conditions




Thisis a monotonic function of (1— sM)D'(i), higher when the latter is a smaller negative quantity. Hence
$4f > 0 has an effect equivalent to making each firm's degree of market power higher.
We now consider the relation between price and marginal cost in a monopolistically competitive equi-




Comparing this with (i.6b), we observe that each firm's markup (ratio of price to marginal cost) will equal
=[1+ D'(iy']—' > 1 (1.7)
Note that in this simple model, the markup is a constant, regardless of any changes that may occur in
equilibrium Output due to technology shocks or for other reasons. This conclusion depends crucially on the
homogeneity of the aggregator function faswell as upon the assumption of monopolistically competitive
10behavior onthepartof firms. Without homogeneity, each firm's markup can depend on the level of output
itself. But abandoning homogeneity also makes the aggregation of different buyers' demands more compli-
cated. Forthis reason, our entire analysis is conducted with a homogeneous f. We do consider departures
from monopolistic competition in section 8 which result in endogenous variations in markups.
If s,ç > 0, the inefficiency wedge p is larger than the individual firm's markup ',althoughthe two are
closely related. The former can be thought of as the ratio between the price of value added (the difference
between the price of output and the cost of materials) and its marginal cost. This is larger than the ratio of
price to marginal costbecause firms mark up their materials inputs as well. For a given value of s, p is
a monotonically increasing function of y, given by
(1—s)
(1.8) 18M7
This relation is important when we consider below the effects of variations in market power. (Recall that s,,
is a parameter of the production technology, rather than an endogenous variable.) It is also important for
understanding the relation between different measures of the degree of market power found in the empirical
literature, as we discuss further in section 3.
We now discuss the relationship between the inefficiency wedge introduced by market power and the
degree of returns to scale. We mentioned earlier that imperfect competition makes equilibrium possible even
in the case of an increasing returns technology, so that we have more flexibility in the specification of V. Iii
fact, once we have assumed market power, assuming increasing returns is not only possible but also more
reasonable. In the case of a constant returns production function (V homogeneous of degree one), Euler's
theorem together with (l.6a)-(l.6b) implies that
—M'=p(rgK+ wHfl (1.9)
Hence > 1 implies pure profits (the value of output exceeds the sum of materials costs, capital costs, and
labor costs). Yet studies of U.S. industry generally find evidence of little if any pure profits on average. (We
discuss this further in section 3.) Hence if market power is significant (as evidence discussed below suggests),
we must conclude that there do not exist constant returns.




11Here increasing, decreasing or constant returns correspond to igreaterthan, less than, or equal to one.
Note that this is a purely local measure that may vary over time as production varies; in the case that V is
homogeneous of some degree, then q' is a constant and corresponds to that degree of homogeneity. Note also
that this is a measure of the short run returns t.o scale associated with changes in the factors employed while
the number of differentiated goods being produced remains fixed; it has no implication regarding the long
run returns to scale in a growing economy with growth in the number of types of goods being produced as
well as in the total quantity of factors employed. Finally, note that this is a measure of increasing returns in
the production of value added rather than of gross output. A standard (local) measure of increasing returns
in the production of gross output would instead be the ratio of average to marginal cost for firm i,i.e.,
= r,K+wH+MI
[(1 —sM),v,(K.,H.) +SM]q,
— _______________ — /r'(1—sM)+8M
Notethat if 5M>0, the measure q will be larger than p, though the two coincide when there are no
intermediate inputs. 6
Abandoningthe assumption of short run constant returns (i=1), we find instead of (1.9) the more
general result
o(q—M:)=p(rgK+wgH)
Hence zero pure profits on average are consistent with p > 1 if the average returns to scale are = p > 1.
Thus increasing returns (in the sense just explained) are required. Note that > 1 also means p > 1, so
that there are also increasing returns in the production of gross output, of a magnitude
=[p(i
—s,4+ SM]' =
Theintuition is simple. With increasing returns, average cost exceeds marginal cost so that price can
be equal to average cost and profits be zero even if price exceeds marginal cost. it is important that these
increasing returns be internal to the firm, rather than due to externalities of the kind postulated by Baxter
and King (1990). Even if there are also external returns to scale the firm will make positive profits unless
its own average costs exceed its own marginal cost.
BOsereeaonthat we emphaaise tlse measure 7 here Is that moat .tudle. is the real businoa. cyde literature umplyassume
a productian function for value added, and as when these authon calibrate the dearee of Inaeaaing returns they are in FaCt
spectIyicg ,ratherthea p.
12The existence of increasing returns of this size is furthermore not merely fortuitous, but follows from
economic principles, as Chamberlin (1933) pointed out. If in any period , j, then there are non-zero pure
profits. This is consistent with profit-maximization, assuming that the number of differentiated goods being
produced, and the identities of their producers, cannot change. (Negative short-run profits are possible if it
is assumed that it is not possible to simply shut down at zero cost, perhaps because fixed costs have been
paid in advance.) But it doea not make sense that such a situation should persist. Recall that we have
assumed that the aggregator /s depends upon the number of goods sold Ig in such a way that the elasticity
of demand for each good —D'(l) remains the same after I changes. With this assumption, an entrepreneur
that produces an additional product earns the same profits on the new product as the profits earned on
all existing products. The reason is that his optimal markup is the same as that of all existing firms and
their optimal markup does not change either. Hence sustained positive profits in the production of existing
goods give entrepreneurs a reason to introduce new goods. Sustained negative profits should correspondingly
eventually lead to exit of some producers. Hence it is reasonable to assume that in the long run, profits
return to the level zero, due to adjustment in the number of produced goods I,.
A simple specification for the production function (1.3) that makes this possible is
rF(KLz1H)—$ Mfl = nuni —I (1.11)
SM
whereF is assumed to be homogeneous degree one, and 4' > 0 indicates the presence of fixed costs.This
is a production function in which marginal cost is independent of scale, but average cost is decreasing due to
the existence of the fixed costs; it generalizes the specification that is standard in the equilibrium business
cycle literature in a way that involves the introduction of only one new parameter. In the case of production
function specification (1.11), the index of increasing returns is given by
'it =
again using Euler's theorem, where 1? denotes value added in industry i in period i. Profits become zero
in the long run if r7 in each industry tends toward a pacticular value, namely 4'/(p —1).This in turn can
be brought about by having the right number of differentiated goods I, relative to the aggregate quantity of
7AlLorcassve epecmficatioes are poasible. In p ticula,, ene can a..ume than the fixed coata take the form of como hed
amount of labor, or capital. The cuxrent apecification atamue. that both labor sad capital can be uxed aa fixed coats and that
the proportions in which they are employed for this pwpese depend on factor price,.




whereN, and H, denote aggregate quantities of capital and labor inputs respectively. This condition requires
that the steady state number of differentiated goods grows at the same rate as the capital stock, the quantity
of effective labor inputs andaggregate output.
Let us now collect our equations describing aggregates in a symmetric equilibrium. Aggregate value
added is determined by aggregate factor inputs through the relation
=F'(K,,z,H,)
—I, (1.13)
(This is of course the output concept for which we have aggregate data.) Aggregate factor demands are
related to factor prices through the relations
Fj(K,,z,H,) = ,.tr, (l.14a)
ztF2(Kg,z,H,) =pw, (1.146)
where the inefficiency wedge p is determined by (1.7)-(1.8). Because our interest in this paper is in the short
run effects of shocks, we will treat both of the processes {z,} and (I,) as exogenous, even though we recognize
that in the long run macroeconomic conditions may affect both technical progress (for reasons stressed in the
literature on endogenous growth) and the number of differentiated products that are produced (for reasons
sketched above). Our specification of these exogenous processes, however, will be such as to imply that our
equilibria will involve only transitory deviations from a scale of operations at which (1.12) holds.
These equations jointly describe the production side of our model. Note that in the case that p = 1 and
4' = 0 these are the equilibrium conditions of a standard real business cycle model. Hence our specification
nests a standard competitive model as a limiting case.
'In this foru,ul..tion. theoutputof each firm slays cenatsot in the steady slate, the entire growth in output is accounted (or
by growth in firms. An alternative formulation that prmerves a constant steady slate markup and degree of increasing returns
is to assume as we did in Rotembeeg and Woodford (1992) that
q =min[F5tHt,1L 18M IM
ndthat •, has the same steady state growth rate as a and hasten the same growth rate as K, and Q,. In this case, an
equilibrium with a constant steady state markup has no growth in the nuesher of firms. The enlirs growth in output Ia rellected
in growth in each firm's output. One could probably also construct intermediate models with constant steady State markups
wherethenumber of firms as well — output per finn grow ova time.
142 A Complete Dynamic Equilibrium Model with Monopolistic
Competition
The economy also contains a large number of identical infinite-lived households. At time i, the representative
household seeks to maximize
(2.1)
where E, takes expectations at time ,fidenotes a constant positive discount factor, N, denotes the number
of members per household in period i, c denotes per capita consumption by the members of the household in
period t, and h, denotes per capita hours worked by members of the household in period i. By normalizing
the number of households at one, we can use N, also to represent the total population, C, =N,c,to denote
aggregate consumption, and so on. We assume, as usual, that u is a concave function, increasing in its first
argument, and decreasing in its second argument. (The class of utility functions is further specialized below.)
Rather than make assumptions about the parameters of u directly, it turns out to be more convenient
to make assumptions about the Frisch demand functions for consumption asid leisure. These Frisch demand
functions depend on the marginal utility of wealth A, which is given by
A,uj(c,h,) (2.2)
Assuming that households can freely sell their labor services for the real wage w,, they must satisfy the first
order condition
u2(c,,h,) —— u3(c,,h,) 2.3)
A,
wherethe second equality follows from the definition (2.2). Combining (2.2) with the second equality of
(2.3), we can solve for c, and h, as functions of A, and w which gives the Frisch demand curves
=c(w,,A,) (2.4a)
h,= h(w,,A,) (2.4b)
Oneadvantage of using the Frisch demand functions is that the effects of all future variables (and their
expectations) on current choices is captured by the marginal utility of wealth A,. In terms of these functions,
the condition for market clearing in the labor market is
H,=N,h(w,,A,) (2.5)
15while thatfor the product market is
=Nc(w*,)q)+(Kgg—(l—6)K1+Gg (2.6)
where G1 represents government purchases of produced goods, and 6 is the constant rate of depreciation of
the capita! stock, satisfying 0< 6 <1.Equation (2.6) with Y representing value added is the standard GNP
accounting identity, except that we do not count value added by the government sector as part of either C1
or Y1. This equation says that one unit of the compceite good at t can be used to obtain one unit of capital
at t + I. It follows that the purchase price of capital, just like that of materials, is equal to one. We assume
that households, like firms, have access to a complete set of frictionlesa securities markets. As a result, the
expected returns to capita! must satisfy the asset-pricing equation
1 =/3Ei{(t)[rt+i+(l_6)]}
Substituting (l.14a), we obtain
= ØE{ (.)i+i)[Fi(Kt+iZl+iHl+i)+ (1_6)]) (2.7)
A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes for the endogenous variables {1 ,K,,H,, w,,
that satisfy (1.13), (l.14b) and (2.5) -(2.7),given the exogenous processes (Ga z, Ng,Ig}. We analyze
the response of this model to changes in z, and government purchases using essentially the method of King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988a). This involves restricting our attention to the case of small stationary fluctu-
ations of the endogenous variables around a steady state growth path. Let us first consider the conditions
under which stationary solutions to these equations are pcesible. Given the existence of trend growth in the
exogenous variables, the equilibrium requires that variables such as {Y, w,,...} exhibit trend growth as well.
However, a stationary solution for transformed (detrended) variables can exist if the equilibrium conditions
in terms of these transformed variables do not involve any of the trending exogenous variables (z, or N, as
opposed to their growth rates).
As in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988a), this requires only that there exists a u >0 such that h(w,)i) is
homogeneousofdegree zero in (w, AhL), and c(w, A) is homogeneous of degree one in (w A0).Giventhese
iThe o,jubIe V, H,.o,, A, muol be meaourwble iih respect to isfoemasiow avsilwhle as time I, while K, moot be meaoorahle
,,ih reopeci go information wv..ilobte t lime I —I. lofsrmasioo.milabls as time I coaaahil. of the real,sasioss at lIme I or arIier
ihe or,obIeo G,.r1 ,N,, 1,. Inaection 6, we allow the inlannatioo .05 to wIno COOtSIs nmepOa" variable..
16conditions, there exists anequilibrium in which the detrended endogenous state variables
- - K1 - H1 = —, K1= H1 = —
z,N1 N1
= , )ig=
are stationary, given stationary processes for the exogenous random variables
Ye - ZI =—,
Ig= -,7=
and a constant population growth rate so that =7Ninall periods.Theequilibrium conditions in
terms of the stationary variables become




C(g,A1) + [7Nk11(1 6)(7)k1] + = (2.12)
1= flE1{(71)° (i')FK((-yj)Kg+i,
111+1)
+ (1- 6)] } (2.13)
Theseequilibrium conditions involve only the detrended state variables, and so admit a stationary solution
in terms of those variables.
Like King, Plosser and Rebelo, we furthermore seek to characterize such a stationary equilibrium only
in the case of small fluctuations of the detrended state variables around their steady state values, z.e.,the
constant values that they take in a deterministic equilibrium growth path in the case that ,!and C are
constant. This steady state can be found by solving the 5 equations (2.9)-(2.13) for the five unknowns Y,
H, tO,Aand k. Since these solutions vary continuously with I, we can then find a value for I for which
(1.12) holds and profits are zero. At this solution, 1, equals (i —1).
Given a steady state, we approximate a stationary equilibrium involving small fluctuations around it by
the solution to a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions. This linearization uses derivatives
°Noie thatvquihbriumconditione in teens, of .t.tioa.ry vn.bie, cn be obtinesi with title tecismqse eventithemodel l,oo
,nuitipk vtve4y otate equilibrie.
17evaluated at the steady-state values of the state variables. in writing the log-linear equations, we use
the notationfor log(Y1/), iii for log(t11/e1), and so on, where the ,iii denote steady state values. The
log-linear approximation to the Frisch consumption demand and labor supply functions (2.4) can be written
= (C,,,ti)t + CC5)q (2.14a)
H1=(H,.Wt + Eff5A1 (2.146)
where the coefficients represent the elasticities of the Frisch demands. Thus the only way in which the
specification of preferences affects our equilibrium conditions is in the values implied for these elasticities,
and so we calibrate the model by specifying numerical values for these elasticities directly. Our homogeneity
assumptions furthermore imply that
— OCHA = 0 (2.8a)
CC,0 — CCA = 1 (2.8b)
(2.8c) C
Thethree restrictions (2.8a), (2.86) and (2.8c) imply that there are only two independent parameters among
'c,, 'Cs, H,o, CflA, and . To preserve comparability with earlier studies we calibrate and CH,o. The
former is the Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption growth holding hours worked constant
while the latter is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply.
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions can then be written as
.t8(K+tcs,1H1—pK7 —(p— 1)I (2.15)
——(k1—H)=wj (2.16) 'XH
H1=(HoWl+ €,,5A1 (2.17)
SC(CCoWI +c5A1J++(!)R1+i— (L(fc1—')] + SGGI = (2.18)
—oj' + E1{A1+1 — A1 + (--.) (R11—+ i'+i)} = 0 (2.10)
'tThe method ci the usme an in King, PIouand Rebelo.Thin can be maderigorous,andjustifiedan an application of
a gvnvralizodimplicit functiontheorem, an shown in Woociford (1986). It should be undemtood that when we refer to email
fluctuationa around the eteady .tn.te values, we hove in mindatationaeyrandom vaciables with a nuilicieeetlyemailbounded
support.
18This system may be further simplified as follows. We can solve (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17) for H1, Y1 and is1 as
functions of K1 and .Substitutionof these solutions into (2.18) and (2.19) gives a system of two difference
equations of the form
"'A \ fE1-4..5\
A( R"') =B() +CG1 )+Dl E1O11j (2.20) \ 1+1 J\l/\ )\E1I11 I
Weassume that the exogenous variables {7,G1,I1} are subject to stationary fluctuations. Thus, as
shown for example by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), (2.20) has a unique stationary solution if and only if the
matrix .4 is non-singular, and the matrix AB has one eigenvalue with modulus less than one and one with
modulus greater than one. Woodford (1986) shows that this is also the case in which the original nonlinear
equilibrium conditions have a locally unique stationary solution. Moreover, when perturbed by exogenous
shocks whose support is sufficiently small, this solution involves only small fluctuations around the steady
state. For the calibrated parameter values discussed in the next section, and for all sufficiently nearby values,
we find that there is indeed exactly one stable eigenvalue. We thus focus much of our analysis on this case
In Section 6, we discuss alternative parameter values that lead both eigenvalues to be smaller than one.
In the case where there is only one stable eigenvalue, there is a unique equilibrium response to the shocks
with which we are concerned. We can approximate this unique response by calculating the solution to the
log-linear system (2.20) using the formulae of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Hansen and Sargent (1980).
The resulting solution is a linear function of the exogenous variables. This means that we can decompose
fluctuations in the state variables into the contributions from each of the shocks that affect our exogenous
variables. It also means that the analysis of the effect of any one shock would not be affected by the inclusion
of additional exogenous shocks.
The coefficients in the log-linear equation system (2.15)-(2.19) have been written in terms of parameters
presented in Table 1. Column 2 of the table gives the formulas which, when evaluated at the steady state
values of the detrended state variables, allow us to compute the value of these parameters. With the
exception of population growth and the parameters related to the lack of perfect competition, the values we
have assigned follow those presented in King, Plosaer and R.ebelo (1988a). Note that, in the case where p
is equal to one the model we have presented reduces to tee standard real business cycle model. We survey
some of the evidence relating to values for the average inefficiency wedge p (for now taken to be a constant)
in the next section. The same evidence is equally relevant for calibration of the steady state markup in the
19case of the variable-markup modelsdiscussed later.
3 Evidence on the Size of Markups and Increasing Returns
Evidenceon the size of markups and increasingreturnscomes fromseveraldistinct sources. First, there is a
literature that attempts to measurethedegree of increasing returns from engineering studies of the average
costs of different plants. Most of this literature, which is summarized in Panzar (1989) has concerned itself
with returns to scale in regulated industries. The returns to scale found in the telecommunications industry
tend to be substantial, with most studies finding returns to scale, which correspond to a value of il in (1.10)
of the order of 1.4. Those found for electric power generation seem to be somewhat sensitive to the exact
specification. Christensen and Greene (1976) found that only half the 1970 plants were operating at a scale
where marginal cost was below average cost. By contrast, Chappell and Wilder (1986) found much more
substantial returns to scale when taking into account the multiplicity of outputs of many electric utilities.
These findings are of only limited relevance to our analysis. These studies seek to measure the degree
of long run returns to scale, i.e.,, the rate at which average costs decline as one goes from a small plant to
a larger one. However, constant returns in this sense is perfectly consistent with large gaps between short
run average costs and short run marginal costs. This would happen in particular if plant size exceeds the
size that minimizes costs. Firms would rationally make such capacity choices if, for instance, producing at
an additional location or introducing an additional variety raises a firm's sales for any given price, as in the
Chamberlinian model of monopolistic competition. This is in essence what occurs in our model. We have a
fixed cost per plant so that lowest average cost would be obtained by having a single plant. In equilibrium
there are several plants, all of which have the same average cost and, nonetheless, marginal cost is below
average cost.
Second, there is a literature which attempts to measure the elasticity of demand facing individual prod.
ucts produced by particular firms. This literature is relevant because, as is clear from the derivation of (1.7),
it is never profit maximizing to set the markup - lower than one over one plus the inverse of the elasticity of
demand for the product. There are many estimates of the elasticity of demand for particular products in the
marketing literature. Tellis (1988) surveys this literature, and reports that the median measured price elsa-
ticity is just under 2. This suggests that the markup 7 of these individual firms would equal 2 if they behaved
20like monopolistic competitors. If our symmetric model where correct, the demand elasticity estimated is
the marketing literature would correspond to the elasticity of demand faced by the typical firm. In practice.
elasticities of demand probably differ across products and the elasticity of demand of those products studied
in the marketing literature is probably atypically low. This is because the marketing literature focuses on
the demand for branded consumer products which are more differentiated than unbranded products so thai
their demand is probably less price sensitive. Thus, the typical product in the economy probably has a price
elasticity of demand that exceeds 2.
Finally, there is a literature which tries to obtain econometric estimates of marginal cost and, in some
cases, combine them with econometric estimates of the elasticity of demand. The aim of this approach is to
obtain simultaneous, independent estimates of the markup and of the degree of increasing returns. Morrison
(1990) is an example of this approach. She estimates a flexible functional form cost function, using data oii
gross industry output and materials inputs. Her estimates of and of i range between 1.2 and 1.4 for 10
Out of her 18 industries. One notable feature of these estimates is that her industry estimates of the ratio
of average to marginal cost closely resemble her estimates of the markup itself. Thus the relation between
these two parameters that we imposed through our zero profit condition appears to be validated.
Hall (1988, 1990) proposes a variant of this approach in which, essentially, equation (2.15) is estimated
using instrumental variables. The share coefficients are treated as known (from measured factor payments)
rather than estimated, so that only p need be estimated; instruments are used that are believed a priori to
be orthogonal to exogenous technological progress 7', and endogenous variation in f is ignored. Hall obtains
large estimates of p for many U.S. manufacturing sectors; it is over 2 for six out of seven one-digit sectors.
We discuss this approach and related estimates at the end of the next section. Here we wish simply to note
that one reason that Hall's estimates of the "markup ratio" are larger than those obtained by authors such
as Morrison is that he is estimating p rather than .
Beforeclosing this section, it is worth discussing the basis on which we state that profits in the U.S.
economy are zero, so that p must equal 1. i2 Total tangible assets minus durables in 1987 were equal to 2.25
times that years private value added. Since private investment (again excluding durables) equaled about
18% of private value added and the yearly growth rate is about 3%, it follows that the yearly depreciation
"For a more complete dascuosionalong similar lines, with independent estimation of the degree of increasing retun,s, see Flail
(1090).
21of this capital stock must be about 5% (to obtain this one must subtract the growth rate from the ratio of
investment to capital which equals 8%). The share of payments going to capital has been 25% on average.
These payments can be decomposed into the product of the capital output ratio and the suni of the rate of
depreciation and an implied rate of return on capital. Thus, this implied rate of return to capital has been
about 6% per annum. It is the fact that this rate of return is close to the rate of return on stock market
securities that leads us to say that there are no profits in the economy. If owners of capital also received
some pure profits, the payments to capitalists would exceed the product of the stock market rate of return
and the actual capital stock. Yet another way of making the same point is to note that, on average Tobin's
q is one (Summers (1981)). This again says that the present value of payments to the oseners of capital
discounted at the required rate of return on equity shares equals the cost of replacing the capital stock.
In the next two sections we study the effects of having a constant markup different from one for the
effects of shocks to government purchases and of technological shocks.
4 Responses to Government Purchases
The first exercise we consider is a change in government purchases G,. To perform this exercise we must
postulate a stochastic process for C,. The reason we must do so is that the behavior of the agents in the
model depends also on their expectation of future government purchases of goods. We assume that 0, is
given by
(4.1)
In the present section we assume constant growth of z, and N,; hence (4.1) specifies an exogenous
stoclisatic process for C,. For the purposes of analyzing the response of the economy to the shock "F, we
sssume that the number of firms I, does not respond to the shock. In the perfectly competitive case where;,
equals I and iI' is equal to zero this involves no loss of generality since the number of firms is indeterminate.
For this case we just set 1, equal to one. In the case of imperfect competition, changes in C, do change
the profits of the existing firms. We nonetheless assume that I, continues to grow exogenously at the same
rate ns ;N,(sothat i, is constant). Abstracting from variations in the rats of entry is reasonable as an
approxinistion because entry decisions involve relatively long lead times.
In a model with constant markups, a change in C increases output only through an increase is the sspply
22of hours at a given real wage. This is apparent from (1.14b). This equation is, for a given constant inefficiency
wedge p, a relationship between the wage and the marginal product of labor where the latter depends on
employment, the state of technology and capital. Since technology and capital are fixed, the willingness of
firms to hire labor at a given real wage does not change. However, there are two reasons emphasized by
Barro (1981) why labor supply will change. The first is that the increase in government purchases makes
households less wealthy. The second is that they tend to increase real interest rates. Both of these effects
raise the marginal utility of wealth )i1andthus raise H1 for any given w1.Thusthe real wage falls and
employment rises.
We compute simulations of the model's response to changes in L4forthe case where p0 is equal to
.9. We chose this value of p° because changes in government purchases are persistent but also have large
components which are mean reverting. 13 We assume that the share of materials in total output 5M1equals
one half. This is a conservative choice since value added in manufacturing is only about half of the value
of gross output iii manufacturing. This parameter plays no role in our perfectly competitive model but is
crucial in the imperfectly competitive case. We report results for both p equal to one and for p equal to 1.4.
(which, using (1.8) with 5Mequalto 0.5 corresponds to a markup equal to 1.17). This markup is fairly
low relative to those that have been estimated in the literature. The other parameter values are listed in
Table 1; they are taken from King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988a).
Figures 1 and 2 report the percent response in hours, output and the wage to a one percent change in
eF.Wesee in the figures that the qualitative response of hours, output and the wage is the same when the/I
equals one as in our imperfectly competitive case where p = 1.4. Output and hours rise in both cases and, as
was suggested by the earlier discussion, real wages decline. But, there is a change in the magnitude of these
effects, for given values of the model's other parameters. We see that output rises by about 0.04% in the
case of perfect competition while it increases by 0.05% when p = 1.4. Because government purchases equal
11.7% of GNP the multiplier for government purchases is less than one half in both cases but it is larger with
imperfect competition. On the other hand, the percent response in hours and real wages is smaller when p
equals 1.4 than when it equals one.
The difference in the responsiveness of hours and output does cast some doubt on the accuracy of the
ouraoaly,,oof militory parchooe. we (ooadthe.eto follow. very per.i.tent botototion.ayAR(2lpr00000. Ear niwpUciy andcomparability withpreviou.literaumw weconolder•pe..latewt AR(1)here.
23common viewaccordingto which the presence of imperfect competition, in itself magnifies the short run
effectofgovernment purchases on economic activity.
14This is argued to reflect the presence of "aggregate
demandspillovers"on consumption demand. Theideaisthat the increase in outputinducedbytherise
ingovernment purchases raises the profits of the imperfectly competitive firms and the resulting increase in
income makes consumers purchase more. It is argued that these effects amplify the response of economic
activity through a "multiplier" process of the Kahn-Keynes type. it is true that, in our model, a larger p.
for given values of the other parameters, magnifies the response of output. But this is solely due to the fact
that imperfectly competitive firms set the wage below the marginal product of labor so that a one percelil
increase in hours raises output by IUSH percent rather than by sjjpercent.On the other hand, a larger
p reduces the response of hours.
The reason for this is easily seen. Hours become less responsive when 1u is increased because the (negative)
wealth effect of an increase in government purchases become smaller. For given prices (wages and interest
rates), labor supply depends upon the present value of after tax income net of wages. In either case, an
increase in G increases the present discounted value of taxes (and hence reduces after-tax income) by exactly
the amount of the increase in G. But, potentially, changes in G have an additional effect on the present
value of income. If they lead equilibrium hours and output to rise, income net of wages increases by the
amount by which the increase in output exceeds the increase in the wage bill. To first order, this amount
is zero when the marginal product of hours equals the real wage but it is positive if the marginal product
of hours exceeds the real wage (i.e.,if firms have market power). Thus, in the case of perfect competition,
a one dollar increase in Clowersthe present value of income by one dollar, while in the case of imperfect
competition it lowers it by less than one dollar.
In a sense the "demand spillover" literature is correct in arguing that the increased profits in the case
of imperfect competition give an additional boost to household income. Where this argument errs is in
supposing that the stimulative effects of government purchases result from a positive, rather than a negative
effect of government purchases on household income. It also errs in supposing that the direct determinant
"See, e.g. Mankiw (1988), Stoeta (1989) and Silvo.tre (1993).
"One con also under,tand from (2.15) the basic of Startz'. (1989) axgumen5 th..t this i just a short run effect. A permaneiI
increase in C wouldpermanentlyinerease profits, requiring an eventual increase in the number of flemo 1. In a comi,ansoi, ci
cteady state vqoilibria (inwhids Iis sosumed to adjust so a. to keep proflt. equal to nero), the percentage inereooe in oiitpoi
equals only'H time, the percentage increasein the laborinput.
24of equilibrium employment is the effect of household income on consumption demand, rather than the effect
of income on laborsupply.
Anotherimplication of Figure 1 worthy of note concerns the effect of government purchases on measured
labor productivity. Since output increases more and hours increase less, in the case of p greater than one,
itisobvious that measured productivity rises more (falls less) in the case of imperfect competition. The
behavior of the Solow residual, which is used as a measure of exogenous productivity growth in the real
business cycle literature, is especially noteworthy. Recall that the Solow residual is given by
— —sKKj (42)
where h' represents the change in the logarithm of Y and analogously for and K1. By contrast.
differentiation of (113) using (1.14) and keeping I constant establishes that
a= — psgiH, — P5KI'Ct
(4 3)
The numerator of (4.3) thus must be invariant (to first order) to changes in C1. But this implies that if
is greater than one and J1 rises for any reason other than a technological shift (so that y' is unchanged)
the expression in (4.2) will rise. In other words, an increase in hours induced by an increase in government
purchases or any other non-technology shock raises the standard Solow residual. The reason is that, with
imperfect competition, an increase in the labor input must necessarily raise the value of output by more than
itraiseslabor costs (since firms make profits on the marginal units). This results in an increase in measured
productivity.
This shows that ignoring imperfect competition when it is actually present is dangerous. It leads to
incorrect measures of total factor productivity. If one wants to measure true changes in z, one must use the
formula (4 3) which depends on p in addition to depending on observable magnitudes.
The fact that the Solow residual (4.2) is riot a correct measure of true technical progress may explain
some observed anomalies concerning Solow residuals. For example, a number of authors have observed that,
in postwar U.S. data, Solow residuals are correlated with various measures of government purchases (Hall
(1988), Baxter and King (1991), Burnaide, Eichenbaum and R.ebelo (1993)). One might argue that this
simply indicates that government purchases are not exogenous with respect to technology shocks. This
might be true of some components of government purchases, especially spending by local governments that
25are forcedto have balanced budgets. But it is hard to defend the "reverse causation" thesis in the case
ofnational defense-relatedgoods, that have moved mainly in response to changed perception of the threat
posed by communist regimes. Yet this component is positively correlated with Solow residuals as Hall (1088)
andBaxter and King(1991)show. Our model can explain this observation insofar it predicts that hours
should increase in response to an exogenous increase in government purchases and, as a result, the Solow
residual should increase as weU if Is > 1. 16
Imperfect competition might similarly explain the observations of Hall (1988) that changes in world oil
prices (that, again, should be exogenous with respect to the state of U.S. productivity) are correlated with
Solow residuals, 17 and the findings of Evans (1990) that various measures of monetary policy shocks forecast
future Solow residuals.
The ability of imperfect competition to explain these anomalies provides not only an argument that
imperfect competition is important but may also be the basis for a quantitative estimate of its importance.
Indeed, this is the basis for Hall's (1988) estimates of s. The parameter s can be estimated using (4.3) if one
observes a variable v1,suchas military purchases or changes in the world oil price, that is both correlated
with output and hours changes and is known to be orthogonal to the change in technology Then v,
should be orthogonal to the right hand side of (4.3). In particular
Cov(vt,
—4usH1—pSKKl) = 0 (4.4)
Hall's proposal is to estimate s so as to minimize (under an appropriate metric) the extent to which the
moment condition (4.4) fails to hold. In the case where vg is a single variable, the expression in (4.4) is
actually zero if s is replaced by the instrumental variable estimate
— Esvi(sHIHI+sKK)
Hall'sestimates indicate estimates of the wedge p of over 1.8 for all seven 1-digit industries he considers.
Subsequent work by Dornowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), uses gross industry output so that it estimates
'6Alternstiee possible explsnssiona of the anomaly that do not depend on imperfect competition are proposed by Baxter and
King (1991) and Burnside, Elclsenbawn and Rebelo (1993).
tlFor a complete dynamic equilibrium model of the effects of il prices whida is constructed along the tom or this paper, see
Rotemberg and Woodford (1993).
'°Explidt development of this lost idea would require, of mum, a model wheremonetarypolicy shocks affect econornw
oceivity, a topic we do not take up here. Imperfect competition in product markets does not in itself imply soy real effect of
monetary policy. On the other hand, so we mentioned in footnote 2, imperfect competition is often a crucial element of models
in which monetary non-neutrality result, from price ngadity.
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5 R.aponzes toTechnàlogy Shocks
I this section wi show th,.t the Iroel ci the rae utashiep stiezg when it conies to the rsaonse of the
economy to Changes in technology. Before we can coinpilt. the ecocoit'i response, we nmti po.tulats a
chistec prnc Re the level 01 technology Itself and Sor the unmbet ci finns. It is not enough to silrçly
compute the size o(the technology ,hockt using (4.3).Thereason as ihIt, once agato, households deciiioni
of how much labor to soppty sod output to eaue dqreud upso thel p.ct'izo1iJ ( the futro SteM 01
productivity. We are also unable, in this csee to ignore tbeisege of yajiatlon In thétate of entry of bew
zrme, is we do not wih to aseurne thai technology shock. have a purely transient sct cit predutisvity.
uac In this section we Sollow K.ng. Plower sad P,ebelo (l6€b) ad Plower (199) I assuming this.
produttivity I a random walk, so thatis a@p.odantjy ditUibUSed random $$l it
'jweshowed (1.12), the ouniben c(5.cuas must p with: Sot o6ts to remain equat to fete In the
steady state. On the other band, sea do not beheve the sunder of flniasustj vary tapidly to i techoclogy
shock.thus wish to eocoentmM on abort run effects ci tsduaolagy shocks byweunagthat entry pisys
ooly a small role in thwe short term dynamnios. To do this, we let!, SoHose an otror-ecerecUosi poocess of the
(5.1)
whereI sad it are positive constsia wink it < 1. ThIs prowes unpile. that with a stationary (} {)) is
itself atmLtoesry se we esswnsd in Ssctiøu 2. By lotting a be smellsir ensure thatthdu is little immediate
entry in respons. to a technology shock, even whesi it is parmasient, We eonjectna. that our results bUtgó
15W.mat, iLl, bec.t the esilits we at,ala.d Is. aheese. sebo.
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27mainly on the fact that the response of entry with a small ic is slow and not on the precise specification of
(5.1). In particular, a small a preserves comparability between our results and those obtained by Hornsteiii
(1993) for a model without permanent technology shocks in which the effects of technology shocks on entry
are ignored.
Differencing (5.1), we obtain




whereI, denotes i I, minus the unconditional mean of that stationary variable while, as before, j' denotes
y, minus its mean. 70
Differentiationof (1.13) now yields
= iY, —PSHiH,—P8KIK, +(p—1)iI, (53) I
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This implies that the change in the number of firms enters the corrected Solow residual (analogous to (4.3)),
in the case of imperfect competition. This is because entry of firms increases fixed costs and thus requires
an increase in productivity if a given quantity of output is to be produced with the same inputs. Thus an
assumption such as (5.1) is necessary in order to measure technology shocks. Removing means from (5.3)
and substituting (5.2), we obtain
= D(L) [i —ps,,iH,—
PSKiKI] (5.4)
where 13(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator whose coefficients depend on p and a. This polynomial has
rio roots inside the unit circle; in particular, it equals 1 when p is one. Using (5.4), we construct a series for
-yfor the U.S. economy using quarterly data from 1947:1 until 1989:4 on private output and private sector
hours while assuming that the change in capital is constant. 21 The construction of our output and hours
series is discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
The first part of Table 2 presents the measured variance offor various values of p. It shows that the
measured variance of technology falls as we increase the markup. The reason is that typical U.S. business
20NOtC that with Lhs notation. if a variablo X is stationary, then AX is the firot difference of X.
tiThia it not niricily correct but, because invmtment is such a small fraction o(capit.oJ, it does not induce a io,-ge bias ,,lo
ourcalcuistion.
28cycles involve procyclical movements in output, hours and the standard Solow residual. If p is greatet
than one, one expects the Solow residual to move procyclically even in the absence of technology shocks u.s
explained in the previous section. Thus a model with p greater than one can explain some fraction of the
variation in the Solow residual leaving smaller unexplained variations in total factor productivity.
We computed the model's responses to shocks in 7 using the King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988a) param-
eters listed in Table 1, a share of materials of one half and, again, values p equal to 1 and 1.4, We assumed
that friisequal to 0.02 so as to make sure that immediate entry had a relatively trivial effect on the results.
The model's prediction for the effect on output and hours of a 1% shock to 7 is presented in Figure 3.
-Ve see that, for a given increase in z,theresponse of output is higher under imperfect competition. The
reason is that, an increase in: represents, in effect, an increase in the effective units of labor that firms hire.
Because firms with market power set the marginal product of labor higher than the wage, au increase in
the effective labor input raises Output more under imperfect competition. This can be seen directly fi-ow
equation (2.15) which shows that the change in output for given hours and capital input is equal to psjj
timesy. This is why a higher p raises the response of output.
By contrast, the response of hours worked is smaller when the markup is higher. Indeed, for our chosen
value of p hours are nearly insensitive to changes in technological possibilities. That the response of hours
to a change in technological opportunities is ambiguous is well known. Because capital is fixed in the short
run, an increase in zraisestemporarily the marginal product of labor and the wage and this leads workers to
substitute current work for future leisure. On the other hand, an increase in zalsomakes people wealthier
and this reduces labor supply. The net effect depends on whether the intertemporal substitution or the
wealth effect is larger. Imperfect competition increases the size of the wealth effect, as in the previous
section, and so reduces the extent to which labor supply increases. If p is made slightly larger than 1.4, a
positive technology shock actually reduces equilibrium hours, though output still increases.
This result, that employment ftuctuations are smaller with imperfect competition, is also obtained by
Hornstein (1993) who discusses it in terms of the variances of output and hours that can be explained by
technology shocks. We next turn to the consequences of imperfect competition for this type of exercise.
There are two different ways of computing the variance of output and hours that can be attributable
to changes in z. They both rely on the impulse response functions which are plotted in Figure 3. Let the
29impulse response functions be written as
= (5.5)
= (5.6)
Then one estimate of the implied variance of the change in output is
(r)2Var(i) (5.7)
%'here Vac(7fl is the variance of the technology shock reported in Table 2. The variance of the change in
hours can be computed analogously.
An alternative computation of the variances of output and hours relies on the historical time series
for the technology shock that can be computed using (5.4). As in Plosser (1989), we can compute the
values of output and hours that these time series for technology shocks predict. If 'givesthe (de-meaned)
historical series for technology shocks, the predicted series for (de-meaned) changes in output and hours ace.
respectively
=e1'-. = (5.8)
We can then compute the sample variance of the series {AY} and {ii).
Column2 of the second and third part Table 2 give the empirical variances of output and hours growth
while column 3 gives their theoretical variances computed using the sample variances of (5.8). We do not
report the variances computed using (5.7) because they are nearly identical. "Forthe standard case where
jiisequal to one, the predicted variance of output is somewhat smaller than the actual variance while the
predicted variance of hours is quite a bit smaller than the actual variance. Increases in p lower both predicted
variances though they have a more substantial effect on the variance of hours for the reasons that we gave
above.
We also present in Table 2 a statistic that provides a further test of the empirical plausibility of the
model's predictions regarding the effects of technology shocks. This statistic relates to the orthogonality
22Aowe snid in footnote 19 above, this is nottrue when technology shocks see sesumed to induce onlytronutory chongos
in technology. When we mourned thot e followed en sutoregremive proc. e obtained muds smaller theoretical soroncec
for outputchangeswhen uoing the method of Kydlsnd and Prescott (1982)thanwhen we seked obool the csriobhty 1
output generoted bythe modelin response to the entire time senes of Solowresidusis.This wm true even when we mode thy
octoregressive coefllciesst equal to .99.
30of the predicted movements in output and hours on the one hand, and the prediction errors on the other.
Wehave mentioned above thata correct measure of technical progress should be independent of the other
shocksthataffectthe economy. Intheprevioussection we showed that if someoftheother shocks can
bedirectlymeasured, this gives rise to an orthogonalityconditionthat can be used to test the validity oF
themethod of measuringtechnology shocks. Butevenwhen the othershockscannot bedirectly measured,
the independence principlecan beusedas the basis for a specification test of a model of the effects oF
technology shocks. For if the technology shocks are correctly measured and the theoretical impulse response
coefficients 'andare correct, then the prediction errors — and 5H —Hshould be expressible
as distributed lags of the other exogenous shocks. 23 It follows that
Cov{M(Z —)) = 0 (5.9)
COV{H, (H —.iR)}=0 (5.10)
Testing the validity of these moment conditions provides a specification test which does not require
knowledge of the other types of shocks. To provide a convenient measure of the extent to which the moment
conditions (5.9) and (5.10) are violated we decompose the variance of actual changes in output as follows
Var(1) Var(M)+Var( -+2Cov{M,(_M)}
sothat





Thus i' measures the extent to which the sum of the variance of output that the model attributes to
technology shocks and the variance it attributes to other sources fails to equal the total variance of output.
The size of the departure of ti5' from zero thus gives one souse idea how seriously one can take a statistic
such as Var(A)/Var(Y) as a measure of the degree to which observed variations in output growth cais
be explained by technology shocks.
no roly on the vsiidity ol the Iog-1inoe spproxrncion introeiucsd in section 2.
31The fifth column of Table 2 gives values of i'andof the analogously defined for different values
of p. For the model to be correct, both w's ought to be zero. Hence, these provide additional moment
restrictions that can be used to estimate p. Such an estimate is then based entirely upon the way in which
one parameter value as opposed to another improves the model's ability to produce empirically plausible
predictions regarding the part of aggregate fluctuations that are due to aggregate technology shocks.
As we can see, raising p from ito 1.4 lowers both w's which reach a minimum for p between 1.4 and
1.6. Thus, the results of this estimation procedure also yield relatively important departures from perfeci
competition. What is perhaps even more interesting is that the resulting estimate of p implies that technology
shocks lead to practically no fluctuations in hours worked. Thus, essentially, the entire movement in hours
worked must be due to some other type of shock.
6 Fluctuations Due to Self-Fulfilling Expectations
The introduction of imperfect competition and increasing returns also makes possible an entirely new source
of equilibrium fluctuations in economic activity. In particular, equilibria may exist in which economic
activity fluctuates in response to random events that do not involve any change in underlying fundamentals
("sunspots"). These fluctuations are caused simply by changes in people's expectations of the future path
of the economy. This need not be because individual agents' expectations are incorrect —instead,in such
a "sunspo equilibrium" it is correct to expect a different future path for the economy, if everyone else's
expectations and actions change in response to the event in question. Equilibria of this kind are nosy
known to be possible in many kinds of intertemporal equilibrium models (see, e.g., Guesnerie and Woodford
(1992)). They are not, however, possible in the case of the standard neoclassical growth model. For there,
the equilibrium allocation of resources must maximize the expected utility of the representative household.
and there is a unique allocation with this property.
Once we introduce imperfect competition, as above, the first welfare theorem no longer holds, and as a
result one cannot show in such a simple way that equilibrium must be unique. Indeed, it need not be, as
Benhabib and Farmer (1992) show in the case of a model with monopolistic competition like that described
here in sections 1-2.Recall that in section 2 we observe that, for our calibrated parameter values, the
2Thrindrtermirsacyof rasioasi expectations equilibrium, and the po..ibility of endogenoux equlibnam lluciuat,ona, ,verv
,ntdixcuxard in the context of model sr Ihi, kind byHammow'(5958). For othw' eanmples of atatione.ry xornpot eqohbru
32matrbx AiB(whereAandBarethe matricesin(2.20))hasonereal eigenvalue with absolutevalue less
than one, and another with absolute value greater than one; this allows us to compute a locally unique
stationary solution to (2.20).Thisneed not be true, however, for all parameter values, and Benhabib and
Farmer show that if p and i are sufficiently large, ABinsteadhas two eigenvalues with modulus less than
one (which for some parameter values are a complex pair). In this case, there exists a large multiplicity
of stationary rational expectations equilibria, including equilibria in which output fluctuates in response to
Sunspot" events.
Consider, for simplicity, the case in which there are no stochastic variations in any of the exogeuous
fundamentals" {7', C1,Ig). Then(2.20) becomes simply
A(Et!=B(A) \ It,i ) \K1
A stationarysolution is given by the bivariate stochastic process
(+i)=AB()+()
where{iis} is a mean-zero white noise "sunspot" variable, and the realization of ui+i becomes knowu
only at date I + 1. In fact, all stationary solutions must be of this form (for some sunspot variable
{ui}). Thus the multiplicity of equilibria does not mean that theory lacks testable implications about the
character of aggregate fluctuations. In the absence of exogenous shocks and to the extent that the log-linear
approximation is accurate, all of the stationary equilibria are simply scalar multiples of a single equilibrium.
Thus the model does not predict the amplitude of the fluctuations, but one is able to obtain definite numerical
predictions about the relativevariabilityof output, hours, investment, real wages and so on, as well as definite
predictions about the serial correlation and cross correlation of all these series. 26 Even when other shocks
are added, the set of stationary equilibria is a set of finite dimension (linear combinations of a small number
of possible types of fluctuations), so that relatively strong restrictions are placed on the data.
Farmer and Guo (1993) show that in the case of a model of this kind that is "calibrated" in a relatively
standard fashion, except for the large values assumed for p and r, the predicted fluctuations in aggregate
a models with imperfectly competitive product masket, sod isscessing return., see Wood(ord (1991), Hommour )i99i), and
Gnu (1991).
t3Thiu udution to the log-Irnesrized equilibriims conditions (2.20) .pprozimste. a solution to the esact equilibrims,cosdidooc,
n the ease that the amplitude of 'sunspot" ftuctu.tion. are .uifidentiy small. See Wood(ord (1988) for details.
25 Early ilusir.t,onu of this were given in Woodford (1988, 1991).
33quantities, in the absence of any exogenous shocks, exhibit relative variabilities and co-movements similar
to those observed in de-trended U.S. data. They argue that in this respect the model's predictions are not
clearly less consistent with the facts than are those of a standard RBC model, with perfect competition,
constant returns, and exogenous technology shocks. The standard model, of course, also seeks to explain the
amplitude of aggregate fluctuations, given that measured Solow residuals can be taken to indicate the size
of the exogenous technology shocks, while the amplitude of fluctuations remains unexplained in the Farmer-
Guo model. The Farmer-Guo model, however, can in principle explain the co-movement of measured Solon
residuals with other aggregate variables; for the model predicts variation in measured Solow residuals ii
response to "sunspot" events that cause variations in output, for the reasons discussed in section 4. 2
The degree of market power and increasing returns assumed by Farmer and Guo (p = 1,72,71 = 161)
is not completely outside the range of values suggested by the empirical evidence discussed in sections :j
aiid 4. However, it should be noted that in their model, assuming somewhat lower values does not simply
reduce the magnzlodeofthe equilibrium response to the sunspot events; it eliminates it altogether. For
the stationary sunspot equilibria exist only if both eigenvalues are inside the unit circle. Since one of them
must be outside the unit circle in the case of perfect competition (because of the first welfare theorem),
and since the eigenvalues vary continuously as one varies the parameters p andtoward one, there must
be a point at which p and t still exceed one but one eigenvalue has a modulus greater than one. The
quantitative reasonableness of their assumptions about p and 'i is therefore a critical issue, more so than in
the case of other consequences of imperfect competition and increasing returns, such as Hall's interpretation
of productivity variations. The reason is that, as shown by Hall, any departures from perfect competition
will generate someprocyclicalproductivity even if the departures are not big enough to explain all the
variations in productivity. On the other hand, Farmer and Guo require that the departures be significant.
Indeed, in the case of Farmer and Guo's calibration, p and r cannot be made much smaller than the values
that they assume. Further research on the magnitude of these parameters thus seems crucial to establish
The posaibility that the observed co.move,nent of mea.m,ed Solo,. residuals with output could be conuxteni wiilt a model
is, which all fluctuations see due to swlffulfihling expectations was fiest tested m Woodlord (1991).
25Tlxe nouns, that the possible amplitude of the sunspot equilibria is unaifected by the parameter values us to some extent
six artifact of the log-linear approximation used here. Lx the case of the log4inear equilibrium condition, (2.20), if any sunspot
solution exist,, solutions exist with fluctuations of arbitrary amplitude. In the case of the exact equilibrium condition, instead,
it is possible that the set of possible stationary sunspot equilibria includes only fluctuations over a certain range of smpliiud,
tue bound, on which collapse to zero as the critical parameter values are approached at which local sunspot eqoulibria cease to
be possible. However, the general point derived from analysis of the log-linear system, that stationary sunspot equilibria crete
to be possible while oem, amount of market power and increasing returns .UU exist, remains valid.
34the empiricalvalidityof their model.
7Modelswith Exogenously Varying Markups
t.Jptothis point we have considered a model in which, as in the perfectly competitive model, the markup
is constant. One benefit of considering models with imperfect competition is that this class of models also
contains models where markups vary over time. This leads to specifications that are considerably richer thafl
those with constant markups. In particular, markup variations may play an important role in generating
fluctuations in equilibrium employment. To show this, we first consider the effect of exogenous changes iii
markups. In the next section, we take up models of endogenous markup variation.
Suppose that there are exogenous variations in each firm's elasticity of demand D'(1), resutting front
variations in the degree of substitutability of the various differentiated goods. Giving this elasticity a
subscriptI, equation (1.7) becomes
=[1+ 1/D(1)]_i (7.1)
Equation (1.8) then implies that the value added markup varies as well. This variation in the markup implies
a variation in the ratio of the marginal product of labor to the wage. In particular, (1.14b) becomes
zF2(K1, z1H1) = (7.2)
Thus varying markups imply labor demand shifts, i.e.,changes in the amount of labor that firms will hire at
a given real wage. In this respect changes in markups are similar to changes in the productivity parameter
a,.Interms of the detrended variables this becomes
F2 =,t9i (2.10') ,7t)
The variability of markups also changes equation (2.13) which becomes
1 = E{(±!)[11÷i/+it+)+(1— 6)] } (2.13')
These are the only equilibrium conditions affected by the variability of the markup. Their linearization yields
—— g) = tug+ It (2.16')
CKH
—o- + —+(±)EKH
—fi+i+ i+i) —(--),} = 0 (2,19')
*
35where ji is thelogarithmicdeviation of the markup from its steady state value (which we shall denote by
p). To solve the current model, we substitute (2.15), (2.16') and (2.17) into (2.18) and (2.19') to obtain two
difference equations which now also involve the stationary random variable jig.
Tocompute how the system responds to markup shocks, we postulate a stochastic process for ji,.Iii
particular, we assume that
ji1=pji1_1+s' (7.3)
We use the same pacameter values as in previous simulations. 29Forthe markup, we assuiiie as beioi'e
that the mean of p is 1.4. We experiment with a variety of values of p'. Figure 4 reports the response ol
output, hours, consumption and investment to a unit shock to u° when p° equals 0 while Figure 5 repous lie
same responses when p5 equals 0.9. Figure 6 reports the response of real wages for both values of p5. The
instantaneous responses of all three variables do not depend to any significant extent on p5. Not surprisingly,
the higher value of p't makes the responses of output, hours and wages more persistent.
Figure 6 shows that real wages decline when markups rise. This is to be expected since increases in
markups lower labor demand. What is important about this is that it shows that, in response to markup
shocks, real wages move procydlically.
One notable feature of figures 4 and S is that, in the immediate aftermath of the shock, consumption moves
less than output while investment moves more. Thus, our model with markup shocks makes consumption
less variable than output whereas investment is more variable. This higher relative variability of investmeiit
is a robust feature of business cycles which the model reproduces. The success of the model along this
dimension is due to the relative unwillingness of consumers with concave utility functions to substitute their
consumption intertemporally coupled with the small sensitivity of the marginal product of capital to short
run changes in investment. These also account for the relative variability of consumption and investment iii
standard real business cycle models.
We also observe that the short run impact on hours of a markup shock exceeds that on output. \Vheii p'
equals 0, a unit increase in s"tlowershours by 1.38 while output falls only by 1.13. This rather large chanc
in hours must be contrasted with the negligible effect of a unit technology shock that we displayed above.
29HenCe, as cotter, the matnx A'B has exactlyoneeigens'alue with a modulus less than one, and so the eqoilibrio,e
response to the markup variations is detenninate, just a. in the case of the rapoesses to variations in government purchases
snd to technology shocks.
36The reason that hours fall so dramatically when p rises, even though they hardly change when : rises is
that, in the latter case, wealth and substitution effects work in opposite directions. In particular, an increase
in zraiseswealth which discourages work. By contrast, increases in p have only very small wealth effects.
The reason is that, to first order, the increase in firm's profits is exactly offset by the losses to consumers.
Thus, the main effect of increases in p is to lead households to substitute leisure for consumption. The small
importance of wealth effects probably accounts also for the similarity of the responses to temporary aiid
more persistent changes in p.
The difference in the response of output and hours is due to the value of PsH. For our choice of parameters
55H< 1.As a result, (2.15) implies that, holding: constant, the change in output is smaller than the change
in hours. This conclusion would be reversed if P5Hwerebigger than one.
We have also computed the variance of the log changes in hours and in output for a variety of values of i
andp5. In Table 3 we display these variances as ratios of the variance of the log changes in p. We normalize
by the variance of the changes in p so that the variances do not grow spuriously as we raise p5. We see
that for large values of p which imply that P8Hisgreater than one, the variance of output actually exceeds
the variance of hours. However for smaller values of p the variance of hours changes exceeds the variance
of output changes. If parameter values of this type are entertained, markup shocks cannot possibly be the
only shocks impinging on the economy. The reason is that, as we saw earlier, the variance of hours is in fact
smaller than the variance of output. However, a larger predicted variance of H can be reconciled with the
model as long as markup shocks coexist with technology shocks. Since the latter affect mainly the variance
of output, a combination of the two types of shocks can potentially explain both why hours fluctuations arc
significant and why output variability is larger than the variability of hours.
This discussion raises the question of whether average markups actually vary, and thus of how touch of
the observed variation in hours can be attributed to them, Important markup variations, with markups
being much lower in booms than in recessions were found by Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1991). Using a somewhat different specification of technology, R.otemberg and Woodford (1991) find that
the assumption of an average markup of 1.6 implies that the variance of quarterly changes in markups equals
1.33%. This number is not directly comparable to the variance in markups in our theoretical model because
of differences in specification and because the actual stochastic process for markups is not (7.3). Nonetheless,
37it is worth noting that the numbers of Table 3 suggest that such a large variability in markups implies thai
output and hours should vary even more than they actually do.
8 Models of Endogenous Markups
In the last section we showed that markup variations of a plausible magnitude can explain the fluctuation in
hours worked. The problem with the analysis of that section is that exogenous changes in markups do not
appear to be particularly plausible. Models of imperfect competition would be more attractive if markup
changes could, themselves, be explained by changes in other variables. Of particular interest iii this regard
are changes in aggregate demand, i.e.,changes in desired purchases away from the future and towards the
preseiit ° Changes in aggregate demand include many of the variables traditionally held responsible for
business fluctuations, including changes in current government purchases changes in the expected future
profitability of current investment (as opposed to changes in the productivity of the existing capital stock).
and changes in "consumer sentiment".
In this section we briefly describe three models of endogenous markup determination and their ability
to fitbusinesscycle facts. These models can be separated in two types. The first has markups depend
only on the size of aggregate demand at different points in time but makes the markup independent of the
composition of demand. In this category are the models of markup determination discussed by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991). The second type of model makes markups depend on the composition of demand but
not on the level of aggregate demand itself. In the latter category fall the models of Bils (1989) and Gali
(1991).
We first consider two models of the first type. The first is a customer market model based on Phelps
and Winter (1970) which is similar to Phelps (1992), the second is an implicit collusion model based on
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
30From a macroeconomic pampoctira .notbar potantially import.snt dete,ninant of avarage markupa,and hence of aggregate
actIvIty,ittholove! of inflation.Banaboo 11992)thaws both thac many searchmodel. imply a00000ctiofl betweeniflotioii
and mai-kiipa,andthatmarkopsin the retail sectorconotroctedalongtheline,of RotembergandWoodford (i99i)ore in fact
negativelycorrelatedwiththe rate of inflation.
388.1 The Customer Market Model
The customer market model we consider is based on Phelps and Winter (1970). As before, firms maximize
profits with respect to their own markup taking the markup charged by all other firms as given, It dilfers
from the earlier model in that demand has a dynamic pattern. A firm that lowers its current price not only
sells more to its existing customers, but also expands its customer base. Raving a larger customer base raises
future sales for any given future price. It would be attractive to obtain such a specification of demand from
underlying aggregator functions for consumers such as (1.1) which would depend on previous purchases.
Unfortunately, we are unable to do so and capture the basic idea by simply writing the quantity demanded
from firm i at time t,qas
='<0,'(1) =1. (8.1)
The variable m is the fraction of average demand Quit that goes to firm i if it charges the same price as
all other firms. The ratio of markups in (8.1) represents the relative price of firm i's good, since marginal
Cost 5independentof the scale of operation and the same for all firms (as in section 1). Thus (8.1) is a
straightforward generalization of(1.2). The market share m' depends on past pricing behavior according to
the rule
m+i =g()mg' <0,g(1) =1 (8.2)
so that a temporary reduction in relative price raises firm i's market share permanently. Equations (8.1) and
(8.2) are intended to capture the idea that customers have switching cts, in a manner analogous to the
models of Gottfries (1986), Klemperer (1987), Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Beggs and Klemperer (1992).
A reduction in price attracts new customers who are then reluctant to change firms for fear of having to pay
these switching costs. One obvious implication of (8.1) and (8.2) is that the long run elasticity of demand,
i.e.,the response of eventual demand to a permanent increase in price, is larger than the short run elasticity
of demand. In our case, a firm that charges a higher price than its competitors eventually loses all its
customers, though this is not essential for our analysis.
Ignoring fixed costs, firm i's profits at Iaregiven by
() m 7uft jA1
39Using (1.8) and an analogous condition for individual markups as well as the fact that Y equals (1—
theseprofitsalso equal
(8.3) I,ji,
Thus, the firm's expected present discounted value of profits from period onward is
(8.4)
where our earlier analysis implies that P.tL is the pricing kernel for valuing contingent securities that pay
off in period + j. The quantity 1 —arepresents the probability that a firm will, for random reasons, he
assigned a market share in the next period that is independent of its past pricing behavior. For example
the firm might cease to exist with this probability. Firm i chooses 4tomaximize (8.4), taking as given the
stochastic processes {p,), {.)}and{Ys/Ig}. Therefore
'()z!}
= 0(8.5)
At a symmetric equilibrium where all firms charge the same price, each has a an equal share ,nequalto
one, and g equals one in all periods. So the expectation term in (8.5) is equal to Xg/Ig where
= — 1)Yi+1 . (8.6) q I',
Note that X can be interpreted as the aggregate profits expected in the future by all the existing firms.
Using (8.6), equation (8.5) can be transformed so that p is
=p(X/})=
1+ '+g'(l)X/Y( (b.i)
Because 'andg'(l) are both negative, the derivative of p with respect to X/Y is negative. An increase
In X, means that profits from future customers are high so that each firm lowers its price in order to increase
its market share. An increase in Y means that profits stem mostly from current sales so that increasing
market share is relatively unimportant. The result is that firms raise their price.
Equation (8.7) replaces the exogenous stochastic process (7.3) that we employed in section 7. The other
equations of section 7, however, continue to hold.
408.2 The Implicit Collusion Model
The model in this section is a simplified presentation of Roternberg and Woodford (1992) which is itself
based on Rotember.g and Saloner (1986). In this model, there are two levels of aggregation needed to go
from individual products to aggregate output. First, there is an aggregator function like (1.1) that gives
total output as a function of the output of a measure of industries. The output of each industry is itself given
by a homogeneous of degree one aggregator function which depends on the output of nconstituentfirms.
The goods produced by each of the n firms that constitute a particular industry are very good substitutes
and, to prevent what would seem the inevitable fall in price until price is close to marginal cost, the litton
in each industry collude implicitly. Collusion is implicit in the sense that there is no enforceable cartel
contract, there exists only an implicit agreement that firms that deviate from the collusive understanding
will be punished.
The firms in each industry, even when acting in concert, take other industries' prices, the level of aggregate
demand, and the level of marginal cost as given. We will consider symmetric equilibria and the profitability
of deviating from this equilibrium by either a single firm or by an industry as a whole. We titus consider
the demand for firm i in industry j at i when its price corresponds to an inefficiency wedge of p', all other
firms itt its industry charge s price which corresponds toand all firms in other industries charge a price
which corresponds to jt.Giventhe homogeneity of demand, we can write the demand faced by firm m its
industry jas
=D1-) !.D(1,1) =1/n. (8.8) PPm
Using the same substitution that led to (8.3), profits for this firm equal
ir= (8.9)
14t Pmlam1t
Ifeach firm existed for only one period, it would maximize (8.9) with respect to its own markup treating
the markups of all other firms as given. The resulting Bertrand equilibrium would have relatively low prices
and low profits. If the firms in an industry charge more than the Bertrand price, individual firms would
benefit from undercutting the industry's price. Higher prices, with their attendant higher profits, can only
be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if deviators are punished after a deviation. If firms interact
repeatedly and have an infinite horizon, there are many equilibria of this type and these differ in the price
41that is charged in equilibrium.
We assume that firms succeed in implementing that symmetric equilibrium that is jointly best for them.
That is, their implicit agreement maximizes the present discounted value of expected equilibrium profits for
each firm in industry j, taking as given the stochastic processes for (pi), (A1) and {Y1/11}. As shown by
Abreu (1986), this requires that the punishment for any deviation be as severe as possible. Because of the
possibility of exit, the voluntary participation of the firm that is being punished precludes it earning an
expected present value lower than zero after a deviation. This leads us to assume that a deviator earns a
present discounted value of zero after his deviation. Sufficient conditions for this punishment to be feasible
and subgame perfect are given in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
Because the punishment is independent of the size of the deviation, a deviating firm sets its price at I
to maximize (8.9). Let X denote, by analogy to (8.5), the expected present discounted value of the profits
that each firm in industry j can expect to earn in subsequent periods if there are no deviations. Then, if the
expected present value of profits after a deviation equals zero, firms in industry jwillnot deviate as long as
(8.10)
where ir is the value ofwhen firm ichargesthe same price as the other firms in its industry. We consider
the case where the incentive compatibility constraint (8.10) is always binding. Thus, firms are indifferent
between the additional profits from deviating in the present and the future loss of X. Since X is what firms
seho deviate give up, is can be given a different interpretation. The quantity (1 —a) remains the probability
that sales will be independent of the history of prices. This can now mean that (1 — a) is the probability
that the collusive arrangement is renegotiated and a firm that has deviated in the past and has exited to
avoid punishment can reenter.
At a symmetric equilibrium, all industries have the same markup, so that each firm sells Q1/n11and.V?
equals X1/nI.Assuming(8.10) holds with equality, (8.9) implies that
rii Y1r1iY X msxlp——ID(p,1)—=I1——l—+— (8.11) p 1s1J It $SgnIgflu
31In RolembergandWoodford(1992)we give conditions under which a determini.tic steedy state esietu in which (8)0) i
uiwaye binding. We also show that, (or email enough etochiatic shocks, there continue, to exist a pertwbed equilibrium in
which (8.io) alway. bind.. This case is dearly most plausible if Xj' I. not too large a multiple of • single period'. plofitu, wliid,
is to nay if a in considerably lee. the., one.
42where p represents the relative price chosen by the deviating firm. Equation (8.11) can be solved for p,,
yielding once again
iz1=p(X/Y) (8.12)
In thiscase, however,the derivative of p with respect to X/Y is positive. The reason is that an increase
in X/Y raises the size of the punishment (the foregone profits represented by X8) relative to the size of
current sales (as represented by }).Itthus allows the firms in each oligopolistic industry to charge higher
markups without fearing deviations. The theoretical model also implise an upper bound on the elasticity of
the markup with respect to X/Y. We show in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) that this upper bound is
equal to p —1.
The two models we have presented both make the markup depend on X1/Y1. Because the sign of the
effect of X/Y differs, they are empirically distinguishable and this is pursued in Rotemberg and \Voodford
(1991).Herewe are interested in seeing what this dependence of the markup on X/Yimpliesabout the
effect of aggregate demand.
8.3 The Response of the Model to Exogenous Changes in Government Pur-
chases
To compute the responses of the model to exogenous changes in aggregate demand we have to linearize (8.6)
and (8.12) around their steady states. For this purpose we assume that .kisgiven by -whileX and
3 give the steady state level of expected profitability and of the markup respectively. We then let .'and
i,representthe logarithmic deviations of andp from their respective steady state values. In terms of
these values, and assuming a constant number of firms Ig, equations (8.6) and (8.12) become approximately
=E{1
—+(--) ++ (4±).t÷, } (8.13)
(8.11)
The linearized model now consists of (2.15), (2.16'), (2.17), (2.18), (2.19'), (8.13) and (8.14). Sincewe
are interested in the effect of temporary changes in government spending, we shall assume that the number
of firms stays constant so that Ig is zero in these equations. We can solve (2.16') and (2.17) for H1 and i11
asfunctions of .(,k, and.Substitutioninto (2.15) gives 'g,andsubstitution into (8.14) then allows us
to solve for X1, both again as functions of the same three state variables. We can then eliminate these foiw
43state variables from the remaining three equilibrium conditions, obtaining a system of difference equations
of the form (2.20) exceptthat ithas three endogenous variables {.),K,1u) instead of only {),K}.
Assuming once again that the stochastic process for government purchases takes the form given in (4.1)
with p0 equal to 0.9, we can compute the economy's response to the shock i4?. These responses are computed
using the parameters of Table 1 with the average inefficiency wedge p set equal to 1.4. We have set a equal
to 0.9 because this is consistent with (8.10) holding as an equality with about ten firms. Finally, we have
looked at two values of e.,. In the first case,ithas the sign suggested by the customer market model and
equals -1. In the second, it has the sign implied by the implicit collusion model and equals 0.39. We chose
0.39 because it is just below the upper bound of 0.4 which applies for our average markup.
The response of output and hours is displayed in Figure 7 while Figure 8 displays the response of real
svages. We see in figure 7 that the response of output and hours is moat pronounced in the case of r. equal
.39 and least pronounced in the casewhereit equals -1. The constant markup case of Figure 1 yields au
intermediate answer. The reason is easy to understand. An increase in military purchases requires that
individuals postpone their consumption so that interest rates rise. This lowers X. Since the increase in
military purchases also raises Y, X/Y unambiguously falls. Thus in the customer market model markups
rise, which by (7.2) lowers the demand for labor at any given real wage. The result is that output and the
labor input do not rise as much as in the case where the markup is constant. By contrast, in the implicit
collusion model the fall in X/Y lowers markups which raises the demand for labor. This accentuates the
increase in output.
The difference between the models' implications for the demand for labor is even more apparent in Figure
8 where we plot the responses of the real wage w,tochanges in We see that the customer market model
accentuates the reduction in real wages that we displayed in Figure 2 for the constant markup case. The
reason is that, as we saw, the reduction in X/Y lowers the demand for labor at any given real wage. Ry
contrast, in the implicit collusion model with c equal to .39 the real wage actually rises, albeit only slightly.
This occurs because the fall in X/Y is so pronounced that the increased demand for labor from the fall iii
the markup actually exceeds the increase in labor supply. In Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) weobtained
much more pronounced rises in realwages byassuming a smaller elasticity of labor supply CH,,,.
Theconclusion from this exercise is thattheimplicit collusion model can generate procychical movementsin real wages in response to changes in government purchases of goods. Because the key ingredient in
generating these responses is the increase in interest rates that leads to a fall in X/Y, similar responses
wouldbe observed to other shocks that increase aggregate demand such as increases in firms desire to invest
because of changing perceptions of future profitability.
In Ftotemberg and Woodford (1992) we considered the actual response of real wages to changes in military
purchases. We showed that, indeed, real wages have tended to rise in the United States following increases
in military purchases. That paper also considers alternative explanations for the finding such as the fact
that the government raises the size of its military personnel at the same time as it increases its national
defense purchases of produced goods. It shows that, even after this is taken into account, reductions iii
markups of the sort implied by the implicit collusion model are needed to explain the reaction of real wages.
In Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) we demonstrated that increases in oil prices tend to raise markups in
this type of model. We showed that this is consistent both with the large size of output reductions that
follow actual oil price increases and with the failure of the value added deflated real wage to rise on these
occasions.
8.4 A Model with Composition Effects
In this subsection we describe an example of a model (that of Gall (1991)) in which markups are affected by
the composition of aggregate demand. In Gali's model both households and firms purchase the entire range
of differentiated goods, but (unlike our assumption in section 1) their aggregator functions f, are different.
In particular, the elasticity of substitution between different goods, again evaluated at the case of uniform
prices for all goods, is different for the two types of purchasers. In all other respects, the model is one of
static monopolistic competition like that described in sections 1-2.
Profit maximization by price-setting firms now implies a markup that depends on the share 9 of aggregate
demand that consists of demand by firms so that
it =(9)[i + (e1D(1) + (1—
where D, and D indicate the elasticities of demand of firms and households respectively. This reduces to
(1.7) in the case that D1 == D.In the case argued by Gali to be of greatest interest, that iii ,vliicli
D,(1) < D'h(1) < —1 one finds that 7 IS monotonically decreasing function ofO1. Because the inefficiency
45wedge p remains the same function ofas before (given by (1.8)),is also a monotonically decreasing
function of 9. Finally identifying
I + M
Oj= = SM + (1— SM)SIl
wheresjisthe share of investment spending in value added, we obtain
=p(sig) (8.15)
where ,u(sJ)isa monotonicaily decreasing function. Gali's model is then essentially the model of sectIon 7
with(8.15) added in place of the exogenous markup process.
In this model, shocks that affect the composition of aggregate demand affect equilibrium markups. This
introduces a channel through which some kinds of increases in aggregate demand may have additional
expansionary effects (for example an increase in investment due to a change in tax incentives). But, it is
not a model where increases in aggregate demand as such have an expansionary effect through a change in
desired markups. It depends entirely on the category of demand increase. For example, if the government
uses the same aggregator as households (an issue not discussed in Gali) an increase in government purchases
will increase markups. This would imply that government purchases are even less expansionary than in the
constant markup model.
The predictions of such a model depend critically upon the elasticities of demand of different purchasers.
Gali provides no direct evidence on this although he does show that the average markup (measured using
a method similar to that of Rotemberg and Woodford (1991)) shows a strong negative association with the
investment share, even when one controls for the levels of aggregate output and hours. (Thus the association
is not simply a reflection of the fact that the average markup is countercyclical).
Another consequence of Gall's model is that, for some choices of the parameters, aggregate fluctuations
can occur in equilibrium in the absence of exogenous shocks. He shows that low expected future markups
increase current investment demand. The reason is that the low expected markups raise the expected
demand for labor and thereby increases the expected marginal product of capital for any given capital stock.
In addition, the reduction in expected markups lowers the wedge between the marginal product of capital
and its user cost. This means that low expected future markups raise current investment which. in turn,
reduces current markups. For some parameter values this effect is so strong as to make the expectation of
46low markups self-fulfilling. Gali demonstrates this possibility, and analyzes the character of the fluctuations
that can exist due to self-fulfilling expectations, using techniques like those discussed in section 6.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that imperfect competition matters; it affects the way in which the economy
responds to a great variety of shocks. It is thus not possible to ignore departures from perfect competition
if one wants quantitatively accurate assessments of the importance of various disturbances. The reason
imperfect competition matters so much is that it affects the relationship between the marginal product
of labor and the real wage. It thus affects the relationship between output, the labor input and the wage.
Because so many of the puzzles in macroeconomics, including Okun's law and the Dunlop-Tarsliis observation
relate to these three variables, imperfect competition is central to the concerns of business cycle analysis.
We have also shown that incorporation of imperfectly competitive product markets into standard dynaiiiic
models of aggregate fluctuations is relatively simple. The models that we have presented can still be analyzed
numerically using standard techniques. At most, a small increase in the state space is required. \Ve have
also shown that imperfect competition need introduce only a small number of additional parameters to be
calibrated and that both empirical evidence and theoretical considerations can be used to bound the plausible
range of variation in the new parameters. The degree to which this direction of generalization of standard
models can improve the ability of such models to explain observed aggregate fluctuations is the subject ol
continuing research.
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Parameter Defined by Values Description
1.004 steady state quarterly growth rate of technology
- 1.004steady state quarterly growth rate of population
0.587 share of private consumption expenditure in value added
SG 0.117share of government purchases of goods in value added
sj (g + 0.296 share of private investment expenditure in value added
6 - 0.025rate of depreciation of capital stock (per quarter)
0.58share of laborcosts in total costs
r t2.i-6 0.016steady state real rate of return (per quarter)
Or 7-i
i/o 1 lntertemporai elasticity of substitution of consumption
holding hours worked constant
4 Intertemporal elasticity of labor supply
cKIJ 1 elasticity of substitution between capital and hours
1,1.4 steady state value-added markup (efficiency wedge)
0.02 rate at which entry adjusts to changes in technology
-1,39 elasticity of the markup (endogenous markup model)
0.9 probability that future sales depend on price history
p0 0.9 serial correlation of government purchases
p 0,0.9 serial correlation of 6S (exogenous markup model)
Except for population growth, parameters displayed above o take the values in King, Plosser and Rebelo
(1988a).
52TABLE 2
THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS











(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.0000 1.3216 1.2263 0.5286 —0.3279
1.2000 1.3216 0.9448 0.6332 —0.1940
1.4000 1.3216 0.7745 0.7632 —0.1635
1.6000 1.3216 0.6685 0.8980 —0.1853
1.8000 1.3216 0.6016 1.0288 —0.2336
2.0000 1.3216 0.5596 1.1522 —0.2952
HOURS STATISTICS
(1") (2") (3") (4")
1.0000 0.8282 0.1833 0.9365 —0.3520
1.2000 0.8282 0.0271 0.8658 —0.0780
1.40000.8282 0.0010 0.8383 —0.0134
1.60000.8282 0.0076 0.8055 0.0182
1.80000.8282 0.0218 0.7644 0.0507










VARIANCE OF THE LOG DIFFERENCE OF OUTPUT, HOURS AND WAGE
VARIANCE OF OUTPUT CHANGES DIVIDED BY VARIANCE OF MARXUP CHANGES
rho=0rho=.3 rho=.6 rho=.9
1.2000 0.9269 0.9363 0.9580 1.0577
1.4000 1.2285 1.2295 1.2317 1.2430
1.6000 1.5626 1.5494 1.5210 1.4145
1.8000 1.9262 1.8926 1.8216 1.5726
2.0000 2.3166 2.2559 2.1303 1.7180






2.0000 1.8613 1.8094 1.7020 1.3480




1.6000 0.1546 0.1584 0.1668 0.2030
1.80000.15710.16340.17750.2340
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